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We Shall Keep On Asking, “What If”:
The Assassination of John F. Kennedy and
the Quagmire of Vietnam
MATSUOKA Hiroshi＊
I: Imagining Another World
1. The Shock Wave from Dallas
Half a century has already passed since the world witnessed one of the
greatest tragedies in modern history. Many Americans still remember when and
how they heard the news of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. The
Japanese people were enormously astonished to learn of his death through the first
satellite TV broadcast program ever sent across the Pacific.
The shock the Americans suffered on November 22, 1963, has often been
compared to such events as the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on
December 7, 1941, or the death of President Franklin D. Roosevelt on April 12,
1945. Later, the explosion of space shuttle Challenger on January 28, 1986, and
the terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C., on September 11,
2001, were added to the series of such unforgettable national traumas.
Only a minority in the United States still believes that a young ex-Marine, Lee
Harvey Oswald, sniped the president during the motorcade in Dallas, Texas, all
by himself. In the opinion of others, Kennedy had apparently been hit from
several different spots and hence more than a single person had to be involved in
the murder. According to an American satire news magazine, the president was
continuously shot for full thirteen minutes and as many as 129 wounds were
inflicted on him, if all the accusations were taken for granted.
1
63
NANZAN REVIEW OF AMERICAN STUDIES
Volume 36 (2014): 63-80
＊
Professor, Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Tsukuba, Tsukuba,
Japan [matsuoka.hiroshi.fp@u.tsukuba.ac.jp]. This article is based on a lecture on June 29,
2013, at the Center for American Studies, Nanzan University, Nagoya.
1. “Kennedy Slain By CIA, Mafia, Castro, LBJ, Teamsters, Freemasons: President Shot
129 Times from 43 Different Angles,” The Onion (date unknown), quoted in Okuna Hideji,
Netsuzo No Sekaishi: Hito Wa Naze Damasarerunoka [Fabrications in World History: The
Reason Why Men Are Cheated] (Tokyo: Syoden-sha Ogon Bunko, 2008), 123-26.
2. Motives Behind the Conspiracy
American political history offers various so-called conspiracy theories, such
as the following examples: President Roosevelt sabotaged necessary actions to
prevent the Japanese fleet from attacking Hawaii because he wanted a justifi-
cation for the United States joining the war against Nazi Germany. The U.S.
government has kept its encounters with unidentified flying objects (UFOs) and
the aliens aboard a secret. American astronauts never went to the moon and the
pictures of their activities shown to the audience were all shot at secret studios.
The 9/11 disaster was prepared by a few top leaders of the George W. Bush
administration in order to legitimize their armed attacks against anti-American
regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq, accusing them of assistance to terrorist groups.
President Kennedy’s death in the Lone Star State more than 50 years ago was
not exempt from such conspiracy theories. Among the suspects for Kennedy’s
killing were: the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and its head J. Edgar
Hoover who had been disgusted by the president’s immoral behavior within the
White House; the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and its former director
Allen W. Dulles who had been fired after a failed attempt of a secret invasion of
Cuba to oust the socialist regime in the spring of 1961; Mafia bosses who had
been furious over the Kennedy brothers’ fight against organized crime; Cuban
exiles who had been indignant at Kennedy’s inaction to revive an anti-communist
government on the island; the military industry that had distrusted the policy of
accommodation with the Russians; the Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev and
the Cuban leader Fidel Castro, America’s rivals in the Cold War confrontations;
Lyndon B. Johnson, a Texan who would have possibly been replaced as
Kennedy’s Vice President in the upcoming presidential election; and Richard M.
Nixon, loser in the race for the presidency in 1960.
Among those suspects, the main force behind the killing of Kennedy was
supposedly the so-called military-industrial complex. They wished to continue
and hopefully even expand the war in Vietnam, lest this vital area should be
overrun by international communist forces. They also desired to keep the Cold
War tensions high so that American military expenditure be maintained and
enlarged, if possible. The assassination helped Kennedy’s successors learn what
would happen to their own lives if they pursued courses leading to truce in
Vietnam or the promotion of world peace, resulting in unnecessary disarmament.
In a 1973 film, Executive Action, a rich Texan is the sponsor of the plot. He
hesitates to give the order of execution, although he knows that any politician,
even the president, can be dispensable for the sake of American national interests.
He is determined to send a final positive signal to the sniper team after learning
from a TV news program about the presidential announcement to pull 1,000
military men out of Vietnam and the anchorman’s worrisome comment that the
present administration is supposedly planning to withdraw completely from there
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within two years.
Oliver Stone’s controversial 1991 film, JFK, is another example. In this
movie, a New Orleans attorney publicly accuses those who are suspected to have
been involved in the assassination plot. He calls what happened in November
1963 a “coup d’éat” by those who wished to have the war in Vietnam continued.
3. No War Envisioned in Vietnam
What would have happened in America and would it have changed the path
toward the quagmire in Southeast Asia had Kennedy lived? According to his
admirers, he would have withdrawn from Vietnam before the war became
uncontrollable. Hence, the war as the world had experienced it in real life would
not have taken place. Even if Kennedy could not pull out of Vietnam completely,
he would have fought the war in a different way with less massive and more
cautious military actions than Johnson took after 1964. Otherwise, he must have
embarked on a more dynamic course of total involvement for victory, avoiding
the folly of gradual and ineffective escalation based on so-called salami tactics
that had been employed in Vietnam.
2
In Running Against Time, a film made in 1990, a young college professor of
history who lost his beloved brother in the war travels to the past with the help of
a newly invented time machine. He arrives on the rooftop of the Texas School
Book Depository Building, where Oswald had been waiting for the victim
immediately before the motorcade reaches the street below. He tries to stop the
sniper in order to save the lives of his brother and numerous other American
soldiers who died in the jungles, mountains, and paddies in Vietnam.
NANZAN REVIEW OF AMERICAN STUDIES 36 / 2014 65
2. Bruce Palmer, Jr., The 25-Year War: America’s Military Role in Vietnam (Lexington:
University Press of Kentucky, 1984), 24; William J. Rust and the Editors of U.S. News
Books, Kennedy in Vietnam (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1985), 182; Ralph Bernard
Smith, An International History of the Vietnam War (London: Macmillan, 1985), 2: 142;
Bernard Brodie, “Accidents of History: JFK and LBJ Compared,” in To Reason Why: The
Debate about the Causes of U.S. Involvement in the Vietnam War, ed. Jeffrey P. Kimball
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), 195-96; James N. Giglio, The Presidency of
John F. Kennedy (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1991), 254; Naka Akira, Kennedy
Wa Naze Ansatsu Saretaka [Why Was Kennedy Assassinated?] (Tokyo: Nihon Hoso
Syuppan Kyokai, 1995), 35; James T. Patterson, Grand Expectations: The United States,
1945-1974 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 516; Larry Berman, “NSAM 263
and NSAM 273: Manipulating History,” in Vietnam: The Early Decisions, ed. Lloyd C.
Gardner and Ted Gittinger (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1997), 181; Francis X.
Winters, The Year of the Hare: America in Vietnam January 25, 1963-February 15, 1964
(Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1997), 193.
4. Possibility of a More Peaceful World
The entire course of the Cold War might have been altered drastically, as the
argument goes, if Kennedy had not been killed. Khrushchev would not have been
ousted from power in the fall of 1964. The partnership of Kennedy and
Khrushchev would have promoted Détente long before it came into existence in
real life in the 1970s. The two leaders would have concluded a more
comprehensive treaty banning nuclear tests than what had been produced in
August 1963.
American démarches with the People’s Republic of China as well as Castro’s
Cuba might have had a certain plausibility. Mankind might have left their first
footprint on the moon as a result of an epoch-making endeavor of U.S.-Soviet
cooperation, not rivalry, in space achievements. Even the substantial end of the
Cold War might have been in sight by the end of the 1960s. Secretary of Defense
Robert S. McNamara later expressed his firm belief that “the world would have
been the better” had Kennedy lived.
3
To accept or reject such theories, a re-evaluation of Kennedy as a president
and an analysis of his foreign policies are needed. Was he an ardent Cold
Warrior who would have pursued the course for glory both in Vietnam and in the
global struggle against communism even after November 1963? Or was he, by
contrast, determined to contribute to world peace and to limit American
involvement in a futile war in Southeast Asia? In order to determine the realities
of Kennedy’s presidency, a look at what he actually thought, said, did, and tried
until the day he visited Dallas is necessary, instead of just pondering over “what
if” scenarios. Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy’s speechwriter and a special
assistant in the White House, insisted that it would be more important that John
Kennedy should be remembered “not for how he died but for how he lived.”
4
II: Vietnam Commitment Re-examined
1. Battleground Against Communism
Kennedy consistently escalated the American intervention in Vietnam for two
years and ten months in office. He kept sending American military advisers
totaling approximately 16,000, violating the limit of 685 defined by the Geneva
Accords of 1954.
5
He ordered the spraying of herbicides in vast areas of South
Vietnam to deny the insurgents food and hiding places, inflicting terrible damages
on the Vietnamese people, land, and water. He organized the Montagnard
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(mountain tribe) troops for operations across the borders with Laos and Cambodia
to cut off communist infiltration of men and materials from North Vietnam to the
guerrillas in the south.
Indeed, Kennedy emphasized that this conflict was “their war” that should be
won or lost by the Republic of Vietnam, not by the United States.
6
The president
flatly denied in one of his press conferences that the United States had sent
combat troops “in the generally understood sense of the word” to Vietnam,
stressing that the American military personnel was nothing but a group of advisers
and instructors.
7
Contrary to such statements, Kennedy changed the nature of U. S.
commitment. American advisers were engaged in combat operations side by side
with the South Vietnamese soldiers, suffering casualties, even though still low in
number. American pilots flew fighters and bombers with their Vietnamese
counterparts sitting in the backseat, in addition to their official duties of
reconnaissance and transportation. Kennedy in essence started the massive
American war in Vietnam, pretending or believing that it was still a low-level and
manageable conflict. “The reality was,” recalled Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., who
was appointed ambassador to Ho Chi Minh City, formerly known as Saigon, in
August 1963, “regardless of how they got there, Americans were in Vietnam and
were in combat.”
8
The president’s motive was simple. Washington regarded the rebellion by the
National Liberation Front (NLF), or Viet Cong (Vietnamese Communists), as
having been triggered by the leaders in Hanoi, supported by Moscow and Beijing.
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The Americans were unwilling to accept any defeat on this essential battleground
of the Cold War. Sorensen described Vietnam as a critical “cockpit” in the life-
and-death struggle between the Russians and the Americans.
9
2. Unclear Intentions
Kennedy occasionally showed an intention to withdraw from Vietnam. He
neither could nor would enact such plans, however, until he was re-elected in the
fall of 1964. His prestige as a political leader would have suffered a terrible
blow, making him a lame duck in his second term and one of the most unpopular
presidents in American history, if Vietnam were lost to the communists. Yet after
re-election he would have been on his second and final term as a president, since
the present constituion would not have allowed him another term, giving him a
chance to act more freely. Thus 1965 would certainly have been the year for
disengagement with little political risk.
Kennedy’ s intentions were recorded by many: Mike Mansfield, Senate
Majority Leader and later ambassador to Japan, who had been an old friend of
Kennedy’s
10
; Kenneth P. O’Donnell, a presidential aide and long time friend of
both John and Robert F. Kennedy
11
; David M. Shoup, Commander of the U.S.
Marine Corps whom Kennedy trusted
12
; Assistant Press Secretary Malcolm
Kilduff
13
; Senator Wayne Morse, who was among the earliest proponents of
American withdrawal
14
; one of Kennedy’s neighbors at Hyannis Port.
15
However, their stories should be examined carefully and not taken literally.
They were first voiced in the late 1960s or in the early 1970s, when the American
people already hated the Vietnam War. The witnesses might have intended to
release their idol, Kennedy, from the responsibility for the escalation and possible
defeat in Vietnam and instead place the responsibility on Johnson. Their
memories might have been transformed by their own admiration of the late
president. Nor can a political motivation behind their comments be ruled out,
since Senator Edward M. Kennedy, the last of the brothers, was still considered to
be a potential presidential candidate.
16
Moreover, nobody, however close his or her relations with the president might
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have been, could judge him correctly based on the words that actually came out of
his mouth. Kennedy was a successful and shrewd politician, moving into the
White House as the youngest elected president at the age of 43. What he said
often varied according to with whom he was speaking and what the listener
apparently wanted to hear from him. Thus, Kennedy continued to make “many
conflicting statements, both public and private” during his presidency, as
Sorensen admitted.
17
3. Realities of the Phased Withdrawal Plan
Kennedy ordered Secretary of Defense McNamara to arrange a phased
withdrawal program in May 1963. Before Christmas 1963, several weeks after
the assassination, 1, 000 men left Vietnam. The remaining military advisers,
totaling 15,732, according to the so-called Pentagon Papers, were supposed to
follow them, gradually completing the mission by the end of 1965.
18
This plan in reality displayed a great deal of optimism and wishful thinking.
It seemed to the Americans that their operations against the communists had been
working quite well. Therefore, the insurgency was to be effectively suppressed
by the South Vietnamese troops with American help and indoctrination, thus
eliminating the need for U.S. military advisers to stay there any longer.
The deadline for disengagement was set based on McNamara’s assessment in
the summer of 1962. At that time, General Paul D. Harkins of the Military
Assistance Command in Vietnam (MACV) had “no doubt” that the United States
was “on the winning side.”
19
He anticipated it would “about one year” to
eliminate the guerrilla forces after the South Vietnamese forces were sufficiently
strengthened.
20
McNamara then concluded that the guerrillas could be neutralized
within “approximately 3 years.”
21
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By the time the formulation of a phased withdrawal plan started, a spokesman
in the Pentagon stated that the Americans and the South Vietnamese had “turned
the corner” in the fighting in Vietnam.
22
Harkins’ conviction that the United
States had been “certainly on the right track” toward an ultimate victory did not
change.
23
He even portrayed the Viet Cong as “a rat caught in a trap with no
place to go and being constantly annoyed.”
24
The argument that Kennedy would have withdrawn the troops from Vietnam
even at the cost of a humiliating defeat is unfounded. The United States would
have left Vietnam only after winning the war. A withdrawal would have been
possible only when many other conditions were completely satisfied: if the South
Vietnamese had become a dependable political and military ally; if they had
learned how to fight a guerrilla war and how to administer their own government
in a proper way; if they had solved the crisis caused by the Buddhist anti-
government movement; if the Viet Cong along with the leaders in Hanoi had
refrained from an escalation for fear of risking a general war with the United
States; if Khrushchev had been successful in persuading Ho Chi Minh or Mao
Zedong to give up their hope of an early unification of Vietnam by force.
4. Rejected Exits
Kennedy accepted the termination of the civil war in Laos in the summer of
1962. The formula was to neutralize this small country by establishing a coalition
government consisting of communist, anti-communist, and neutral Laotians. The
proposal made by French President Charles de Gaulle in August 1963 for a
neutralized Vietnam might have enabled him to follow a similar path.
The Kennedy administration in fact gave no serious consideration to this
option because of the unreliability of the communist promises, the disappointment
at the start of the civil war in Laos soon after the ceasefire, disgust at the thought
of sitting at a conference table with the communists, and fear that any negotiation
could well lead to a possibly disastrous policy of appeasement similar to what the
world had experienced at the Munich Conference of 1938.
Another chance for withdrawal appeared in the spring of 1963. The South
Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu, a
substantial backbone of the regime, demanded a sharp reduction of the number of
American personnel, both military and civilian. They had been frustrated with
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the rapid increase of American military advisers and resented the American
infringe on South Vietnam’s national sovereignty. This could have been a golden
opportunity for Kennedy. He was once asked how he planned to manage the
withdrawal from Vietnam without America losing its prestige. “Easy,” he replied.
“Put a government in there that will ask us to leave.”
25
Kennedy was, however, embarrassed and refused to withdraw. He was afraid
that the American public would conclude that the U.S. had no obligation to
defend a country that does not want to be defended. He persuaded the Diem
regime of the necessity of maintaining and even enlarging the American advisory
group to defend South Vietnam against communist aggressions and to rule the
South Vietnamese in an effective and democratic way. For Kennedy,
withdrawing from Vietnam was one thing, but being sent away was quite another.
One more opportunity for Kennedy to quit the fighting before it was too late
was wasted. Nhu, possibly with the acquiescence of his brother, the president,
had been secretly in touch with the cadre of the NLF and the agents of the
government in Hanoi, mainly for the purpose of retaining the power even after a
defeat. Roger Lalouette, French Ambassador to Saigon, and Mieczyslaw Maneli,
chief of the Polish delegation to the International Control Commission (ICC)
established in 1954, were willing to be mediators between the communist and
non-communist Vietnamese.
Washington tried its best to prevent a successful conclusion of the
negotiations. The Kennedy administration’s fear of being sold out by Diem and
Nhu was shared by the South Vietnamese generals who removed Diem three
weeks prior to Kennedy’s assassination.
Thus, it becomes evident that Kennedy refused almost every potentially
honorable way out of the Vietnam War.
III: Cold War Diplomacy in Foreign and Domestic Contexts
1. Holding the Truce Line
Kennedy has been highly regarded for his successful solution of crises such as
those in Berlin, Laos, Cuba, and the Congo, the installation of the so-called hot
line between Moscow and Washington, the conclusion of the Partial Test Ban
Treaty (PTBT), and the export of wheat to the Russians. He also called for a
peaceful coexistence with the communist bloc in his historic speech at the
American University in June 1963. He even advocated a joint U.S.-Soviet flight
to the moon instead of continuing a useless space race between the two countries.
However, the philosophy dominating Kennedy’s diplomacy did not essentially
deviate from those of his predecessors, Presidents Harry S. Truman and Dwight
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D. Eisenhower. All trouble spots in the world were regarded as crucial testing
grounds of will and power between the two superpowers and, especially, the two
leaders engaged in a diplomatic duel. Kennedy had to avoid being or appearing
soft on communism.
The president believed in the principle of falling dominoes, fearing that one
local setback would be followed by another, with its chain reaction causing
irreversible effects for the American posture all around the globe. He admitted to
the possibility of “a collapse” not only of South Vietnam but also of Southeast
Asia as a whole.
26
Even the Middle East would be in jeopardy, if Vietnam was
lost to communist forces.
27
In a TV interview in early September 1963, he
repeated his strong belief in the so-called domino theory because of the large
influence of Communist China.
28
In the 1960 presidential election, Kennedy and the Democratic Party had
attacked the foreign policy of the Republican administration for allowing for the
expansion of communist influence in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin
America. Kennedy was set not to repeat the same mistakes. According to Walt
W. Rostow, an economist who joined the administration as a national security
adviser, the United States had to hold the “truce lines of the Cold War” dividing
the planet into two parts.
29
2. Search for the Status Quo
When the communist bloc suddenly began building the wall separating East
and West Berlin in the summer of 1961, Kennedy refrained from any action
except for a show of strength and determination to defend West Berlin by
dispatching U.S. troops, his vice president, and General Lucius D. Clay who had
been the commander in Berlin during the Soviet blockade of the western part of
the city in the late 1940s. That spot, as well as Germany and Europe as a whole,
had already been divided into communist and non-communist areas. Red bricks
and barbed wires did not alter the political reality already existing for more than a
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decade.
A neutralized Laos was a better option for Kennedy than giving up the
country’ s northern part by demarcation or losing the whole country to the
communist Pathet Lao movement, considering the weakness of the right-wing
forces the Americans had supported since the mid-1950s. In Vietnam, the most
important goal was to protect the anti-communist regime south of the 17th
parallel against aggression by the guerrillas supported by North Vietnam.
Kennedy told Indian Minister of Defense V.K. Krishna Menon that he “would
like to see the United States out of that area, but would not want its withdrawal to
leave control to the North.” He even admitted that “the best thing is for Vietnam
to remain divided” and he wanted to “avoid an unfavorable shift of power in
Vietnam.”
30
Kennedy hated Castro’s regime in Cuba because the socialist island in the
Caribbean Sea had been a symbol of communist infringement on the line
separating the two spheres of influence. He did not hesitate to step up American
covert operations there, including sabotages, subversions, and even the
assassination attempts of Castro. Massive economic and military aid were poured
into the Latin American countries in the name of the Alliance for Progress to
prevent any unfavorable change and the spread of communist revolution in the
Western Hemisphere.
3. Limits of the Pax Russo-Americana
Kennedy’s quest for peace depended on at least tacit consent by the Soviet
leader. However, Khrushchev declared his support of every national liberation
war in the developing world two weeks before Kennedy’s inauguration. The new
U.S. president regarded it as a grave affront to the United States and to himself,
although this statement was in essence a response to the Chinese communists’
attack on the Kremlin for sacrificing revolutionary movements to accommodate
the Americans and buy safety in the nuclear age.
Kennedy’s answer to the Soviet leader was a newly formulated doctrine of
counterinsurgency and his willingness to demonstrate in Vietnam that it would
work effectively in an unconventional war. This small country thus became an
arena of collision between the strategies for maintaining the status quo and for the
communist-led revolutionary uprisings.
An agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union maintaining
two Vietnamese states could secure no approval by the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam. History showed that Hanoi’s desire for reunification transcended any
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directive from Moscow or Beijing. Even if the North Vietnamese had accepted
Russian or Chinese demands for restraint, the NLF leaders in the south, with their
own power base and objectives, probably would not listen to orders coming from
the north to lower the level of attacks against the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem.
In April 1963, when the crisis in Laos had almost reached its peak,
Khrushchev admitted to W. Averell Harriman who had been in charge of the
peace talks at Geneva that the Soviets had “very limited information” on the
events in Laos and a “very limited ability” to influence the situation there.
31
Leonard S. Unger, American Ambassador to Vientiane, also observed that the
Russians could in fact exert “very little” influence over the behavior of the
communist Laotians or Vietnamese, as he explained to President Kennedy several
months later.
32
Not only Berlin but also Cuba remained points of possible U.S. -Soviet
confrontation even at the time of Kennedy’s death. Neither a comprehensive test
ban treaty nor an agreement preventing nuclear proliferation was in sight.
Cooperation in space explorations was still a distant dream. A long way
remained on the road toward the establishment of what is called the Pax Russo-
Americana, an international order maintained through cooperation between the
two giants in world politics. In addition, Red China rather than the Soviet Union
had become the most formidable enemy of the Americans by 1963, with its
influence upon small nations in Asia growing and with the Sino-Soviet disputes
becoming increasingly heated.
4. Re-election by Landslide Wanted
Kennedy’s fateful trip to Dallas was an early move in his campaign for a
targeted re-election in 1964. This time, a landslide victory was badly needed to
enable more achievements in his second term. He could neither afford to replace
his running mate Johnson with a more preferable candidate nor refuse to go to
Texas, which possessed as many as 25 electoral votes, constituting more than 9
percent of the required votes. Worse, his support of the civil rights movement
had cost him a share of his political backing in the southern states.
It was therefore a reasonable decision for him to postpone the withdrawal
from Vietnam until after November 1964. Kennedy, as a junior senator from
Massachusetts, portrayed eight American Senators’ courageous behavior in his
Pulitzer Prize winning book, Profiles in Courage, in 1956. Less than a decade
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later, he revealed his indecision and lack of political courage in his dealings with
the Vietnam issue as a president.
There were, however, some occasions when he showed political courage. He
was willing to risk his re-election if the success of the Civil Rights Bill or the
Partial Test Ban Treaty could be secured. He was determined to carry on the
moral fighting against racial discrimination in America. He sincerely wished to
ensure better lives for his and others’ children all over the world by relieving them
of the fear of nuclear holocaust.
However, he conducted no campaign to convince the American public or the
Congress of his withdrawal plan even at the risk of losing South Vietnam to the
communists. He found it extremely difficult to overcome the hard-line anti-
communism within the American society. It would have been a task next to
impossible for any president during the Cold War.
Furthermore, Kennedy had a responsibility to his own family. What would
have happened to the political careers of his two younger brothers, Attorney
General Robert Kennedy and Senator Edward Kennedy, if he really had retreated
from one of the most important battlefields of the Cold War and suffered a great
loss in his prestige as a statesman? Could John F. Kennedy afford to sacrifice the
dream of the dynasty dominating American politics? There is a high probability
that he chose to reject such a road because it would lead to the deep disappoint-
ment of his family members.
IV: The Myth Still Lives On
1. Wishing to Pull Out and Stay
In sum, there is serious doubt about Kennedy’s intention to disengage from
Vietnam by 1965 at any cost. Instead, he was trying to increase, not decrease, the
intervention in Vietnam until the time of his unexpected death. Similarly, his
disengagement policy would not have worked well in the context of the American
commitment in Southeast Asia, the requirements of the Cold War diplomacy,
election politics within the United States, and the ambitions of the Kennedys.
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., a historian and Kennedy’ s special assistant,
observed that the president was certainly “looking for the way out.”
33
However,
Kennedy confessed to one of his aides that he was willing to get the Americans
out of Vietnam but added: “Exactly how I’m going to do it, right now, I don’t
know.”
34
In May 1963, Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson advised
Kennedy that the United States should “get out” of Vietnam as soon as possible.
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The latter replied: “That’s a stupid answer. Everybody knows that. The question
is: How do we get out?”
35
Few advocates of the sincerity of Kennedy’s withdrawal plan can deny the
ambiguity of his Vietnam policy. He was neither ready to surrender the country
to the communists nor prepared to dispatch large American forces to defend it.
He wanted to minimize the conflict and let the Vietnamese fight on behalf of the
Americans and, simultaneously, to expand the activities of the U.S. military
personnel to assure victory in this counter-guerrilla warfare.
The president told Ambassador Lodge at the end of August 1963, while he
was pondering if the United States should promote a coup d’état to oust the Diem
government, that failure would be “more destructive than an appearance of
indecision” as demonstrated by his own failure in the so-called Bay of Pigs
invasion to overthrow Castro’s regime in Cuba more than two years earlier.
36
Kennedy’s course of action was focused on what he believed to be the least
required in maintaining South Vietnam and buying time as long as he could. As
Sorensen later admitted, Kennedy had “left the United States neither fully in nor
fully out.”
37
2. Never-Ending Dreams
Many people have sketched out ideal scenarios regarding Kennedy’s possible
actions on Vietnam, despite the huge difficulties he would certainly have faced in
the process of evacuation. Several factors contributing to the magic surrounding
the idea of what might have been can be identified.
The image of Kennedy as a great leader with noble ideals was produced
intentionally by his widow Jacqueline, the Kennedy family, and his sympathizers.
According to this image, the glorious days of Kennedy’s White House were
suddenly and regrettably ended by several bullets in Dallas. Kennedy then
became “a man who flashed across the sky for a brief moment,” according to
Schlesinger’s recollection.
38
The powerful illusion created by the Kennedy assassination has also been a
reflection of the American people’s feeling that everything had gone wrong since
that sunny day in November 1963: a raging war in Vietnam; racial riots in cities
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and towns across the United States; a worsening public safety situation; the
collapse of the U.S. economy; repeated lies told and crimes committed by
presidents; a sharp decline of American influence in international politics. The
death of Kennedy was regarded as the beginning of these days full of nightmares.
Portraying Kennedy as a highly respected statesman trying hard to withdraw
from Vietnam and to establish world peace has been based on the complete
separation of his character from every misperception and mistake made by the
United States government. In this version of history, it were his successor
Johnson, military leaders, hawkish politicians, the military-industrial complex,
and an anti-communist public opinion that led the country to the great tragedy of
Vietnam.
3. After the Shining Moment
Such an argument has derived from the more or less subconscious belief in the
omnipotence of the United States as a superpower and its president as a superman
in the world arena. When Kennedy wanted a war, he could have started one. If
he really wished peace, he should have implemented it. In reality, even a great
power led by a respected and influential leader can never be relieved of the many
constraints of every nation or human being. Neither Kennedy nor Khrushchev
could escape from this trap. An agreement between the two leaders could have
changed the world possibly to a great extent, but only with the assistance of many
factors surrounding them.
Pondering what might have been and blaming outside forces without facing
the harsh reality and admitting responsibility for actual events and actions might
make life easier. However, the majority of Americans did support Johnson,
enabling him to beat Republican Senator Barry M. Goldwater with a landslide
victory in November 1964. They also endorsed Johnson’ s decision to start
bombing North Vietnam as retaliation for torpedo attacks on American
destroyers. Johnson was fearful of becoming the first president ever to lose a war
because of strong anti-communist feeling within the United States. The
American public generally supported the war in Vietnam until the mid-1960s.
4. Kennedy as a Political Leader
Kennedy was at least potentially a great leader, besides the criticism of his
Vietnam and Cold War policies noted above. Kennedy had grown to be a full-
fledged president during his 1,037 days in the White House. He had increasingly
been accepted and admired as a true world leader. Many would agree that five
more years of his presidency would have produced a different history.
He was also a politician well suited for the atmosphere of the 1960s, when
people believed that the political situation was headed in a happier and more
NANZAN REVIEW OF AMERICAN STUDIES 36 / 2014 77
peaceful direction and that they could and would overcome the difficulties in their
society. Problems of peace and war, disarmament, poverty and hunger, diseases,
racial discrimination, ignorance and prejudice had been, as Kennedy said,
“manmade” without exception. Therefore, all of them could and should be solved
by man’s “reason and spirit.”
39
Thus he led the United States and the world into
an era full of changes, hopes, and possibilities. Many people, young and old,
could not escape the feeling that they had been deprived of their own hopes of a
better future when Kennedy was killed.
Only a few months after Kennedy’s unexpected death four young musicians
from England attracted American boys and girls. Some insist that the Beatles
immediately won their hearts by filling the psychological vacuum of the
teenagers. The “Fabulous Four” provided the whole country with an upswing in
their morale.
40
The sense of loss had been providing the fuel for enduring dreams
of “what if” scenarios and it will remain that way at least in the near future.
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